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REVELATION AND INSPIRATION: 
THE HISTORICAL-COGNITIVE MODEL 
FERNANDO L. CANALE 
Andrews University 
This article attempts to sketch, in broad strokes, a preliminary 
outline of a revelation-inspiration model which, developed in 
faithfulness to the sola Sm;Ptura principle, might yield a viable 
alternative to the classical and liberal models discussed in previous 
articles.' My preceding assessment. has shown that in addressing the 
epistemological origin of Scripture the classical and liberal models do 
not properly integrate biblical claims with the phenomena of Scripture. 
Let me underline, once again, that I am not challenging the internal 
coherence or viability of either the classical or the liberal models. They 
provide coherent explanations of the epistemological origin of Scripture. 
Their shortcomings surface in relation to their external coherence with 
the fact they try to explain, namely, Scripture itself. The classical model 
has difficulties integrating the phen~mena of Scripture, while the liberal 
model finds it impossible to accept the claims of Scripture on divine 
revelation and inspiration liter all^.^ In this respect both models seem to 
fall short of formulating a theoretical explanation of the epistemological 
origin of Scripture in which the full scope of the claims of Scripture 
about itself-the so-called doctrine of Scripture-and the phenomena of 
Scripture-actual characteristics of Scriptures as they are given to us-are 
properly accounted for without contradiction. 
Because of this and other reasons presented in the concluding 
remarks of my last article, it seems that in spite of the almost 
'Fernando L. Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Ground for a New 
Approach," AUSS 31 (1993): 91-104; "Revelation and Inspiration: Method for a New 
Approach," AUSS 31 (1993): 171-194; "Revelation and Inspiration: The Classical Model," 
AUSS 32 (1994): 7-28; and "Revelation and Inspiration: The Liberal Model," AUSS 32 
(1994): 169-195. 
'For instance, see James D. G. Dunn's critique of the evangelical understanding of 
the classical model which leans toward explaining the origin of Scripture on the basis of 
inspiration ("The Authority of Scripture According to Scripture [Part 11," Churchman 99 
[1982]: 104-122). 
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unchallenged authority that the classical and liberal models exercise 
today over Christian theology, there is room for yet another model. 
Christian theology does not need to feel imprisoned or predetermined 
by traditional views. A new explanation for the epistemological origin 
of Scripture may still be explored, developed, and evaluated. The 
~oss ib i l i t~  of such an alternate interpretation will be examined in this 
article, following the methodology delineated in my second article, 
beginning with the ground discovered in the first article and adopted in 
the analysis of the classical and liberal models. Because of the subject 
matter under consideration, this article will follow the style of a critical 
essay, appropriate to the task of theological inquiry. 
1. The Nature of the Issue 
As the exploration of an alternate model of revelation-inspiration 
is undertaken, it should be brought to mind that the issue under 
scrutiny is the epistemological origin of Scriptures and not their 
veracity, accuracy, inerrancy, or interpretation. The goal that an 
epistemological theory of revelation and inspiration strives to achieve 
is precise and modest. The epistemological investigation of the origin of 
Scripture seeks to uncover the a priori conditions under which the 
cognitive origin of the phenomenon under scrutiny can be properly and 
coherently conceived as p~ssible.~ 
Scripture is a given fact. We have direct access to it. The question 
is not about the existence, veracity, or accuracy of its statements, or 
even the defense of the biblical claim that its words are the words of 
God (2 Tim 3:16; 2 Pet 121;  1 Thess 2:13). The difficulty, rather, is 
whether Scripture's claim to be the concepts and words of God is 
possible. This is the problem to be clarified by an epistemological 
approach to revelation and inspiration. 
Our endeavor raises, first of all, the issue of method: How should 
the matter be examined, and on what basis could we arrive at viable 
conclusions? As already argued in my second article, the method to be 
followed here is systematic. Thus, the answer to the question about the 
methodology to be followed in this probe is simple. The systematic 
method basically involves the identification of the subject matter to be 
clarified and the presuppositions required for its clarification. I have 
already recognized the subject matter of our inquiry as the study of the 
conditions of the possibility that the words of man which we find in 
3Here I am not using the term "a priori" in the Kantian sense of independence from 
sensory perception, but rather in the broader analogous sense of "anteceding the fact or 
issue under consideration." 
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Scripture may be at the same time the words of God. Next, the 
presuppositions that condition the interpretation of the epistemological 
origin of Scripture need to be ascertained from the contents of 
Scripture, thus following the sola Scriptura On that basis, a 
determination regarding whether the biblical claim is possible or not 
could be reached; as well, a working description of the general design 
of the model could be made.' Specifically, the conditions for the 
possibility of Scripture's claim that its humanly uttered words in their 
entirety are the words of God (2 Tim 3:16) depend on the interpretation 
of the presuppositional structure. In short, the possibility and the actual 
configuration of an alternate model of revelation and inspiration are 
determined at the level of the presuppositional structure. 
After the Kantian epistemological revolution at the root of 
modernity and postmodernity, the question before us regards the 
possibility of conceiving the whole cognitive content of Scripture as 
originated in God. Is it possible to affirm that the cognitive contents of 
Scripture are the word of God without automatically subscribing to the 
classical model and its limitations vis-a-vis the sola Scriptura prin~iple?~ 
Or, should Christian theologians capitulate to the uncritical assumption 
that the only viable alternative is the acceptance of the liberal 
conviction, according to which the epistemological origination of 
Scripture stems from human imaginati~n?~ 
4This methodology is not new. It is the same that Kant followed in his Crittque of 
Pure Reason (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1990), 12-15. By this methodology, Kant developed 
the study of epistemology into an independent philosophical discipline (15). 
5A recent representative of this theological approach is Thomas Oden's consensual 
theology (The Living God [San Francisco: Harper, 19921, ix). 
Pannenbeq's cogent and scholarly conceived theology represents a prominent 
example of a neoclassical systematic approach built on the conviction that Scripture and 
theology epistemologically originate in the human imagination, through which the 
religious experience of the divine has been and still is put down in writing (Theology md 
the Philosophy of Science [Philadelphia: Westminster, 19761, 301-310; Systematic Theology 
[Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19911, 1:165-187). For a comprehensive study of Pannenberg's 
view on the epistemological origin of Scripture, see Frank Hasel, "Scripture in the 
Theologies of W. Pannenberg and D. G. Bloesch: An Investigation and Assessment of Its 
Origin, Nature, and Use" (Ph.D. dissertation, Andrews University, 1994), 107-1 12. See also 
Bruce L. McCormack, "Divine Revelation and Human Imagination: Must We Choose 
Between the Two?" S/T 37 (1984): 431-455; and David J. Bryant, Faith and the Play of 
Imagination: On the Role of Imagination i n  Religion (Macon, GA.: Mercer University 
Press, 1989). 
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2. The Presuppositional Structure 
It is impossible to address revelation and inspiration as an 
epistemological problem if one maintains, against the testimony of 
Scripture, that human beings alone are the originators of its cognitive 
contents. God's activity is the necessary condition that must be assumed 
for revelation-inspiration to become an issue in need of theological 
clarification. The epistemological question already pointed out consists 
in whether God's activity could be conceived as cognitively reaching 
human beings, thus making possible Scripture's claim regarding its own 
origination. Once God's cognitive activity is considered, the essential 
characteristics of the cognition involved in the origination of Scripture 
must also be elucidated. 
The answer to the question about the possibility of cognitive 
revelation-inspiration receives a negative answer in the liberal 'm~del.~ 
The classical model, on the contrary, gives a positive answer: Cognitive 
revelation is possible. A problem with the answer of the classical model 
lies in the way the essence of cognition is conceived. As God's activity 
and man's cognitive capabilities, necessary for receiving God's 
revelation, operate in the realm of timelessness, the practical outcome 
is a restricted and ambiguous theory of revelation-inspiration. The 
limitation can be seen in the fact that, according to the classical model 
- 
of revelation, most biblical contents are originated by man, very few by 
God (revelation). The ambiguity can be observed in relation to 
inspiration, which comes to the rescue of the limited range of 
revelation. When the human writer puts into words contents that have 
not been originated by God (revelation), the classical theory maintains 
that God, in one way or another, through the Holy Spirit, controls the 
human process of writing (inspiration), miraculously turning it into his 
own cognitive verbal expression. God is supposed to supernaturally 
inspire Scripture without interfering with human freedom and initiative. 
So, according to the classical model, God does not originate all the 
contents of Scripture (revelation); but on the other hand, God through 
the inspiration of the Holy Spirit originates the entire content of 
Scripture. This is not the time to analyze these problems and the 
unabated attempt to answer the many ways in which the limitations 
and ambiguities of the classical model continue to surface. I basically 
agree with the answer provided by the classical model to the question 
about the possibility of revelation, but feel uncomfortable with the 
7Canale, "Revelation & Inspiration: The Liberal Model," AUSS 32 (1994):171-173, 
194. 
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intellectual foundation on which it is built, namely, the timelessness of 
God's actions and human cognition. For this reason I suggest the need 
to overcome this source of limitations and ambiguities. To do this 
requires nothing less than a foundational reinterpretation of the 
understanding of the presuppositional structure. 
The ground for suggesting a new model, therefore, rests on the 
possibility that the presuppositional structure may be interpreted in a 
different way. Such a reinterpretation should be instrumental in yielding 
not only a positive answer regarding the question about the possibility 
of revelation-inspiration, but also a new understanding of the essence of 
the cognition involved in revelation-inspiration. Only then could the 
limitations and ambiguities of the classical model be overcome. The 
ground I am referring to has already been uncovered in the first article 
of this series. Briefly, it consists in replacing the timeless conception of 
God's nature and actions with a temporal-historical one.' 
The temporal-historical conception of God's being and actions 
radically departs from the classical and the liberal models. In accordance 
with Scripture, this component of the presuppositional structure entails 
God's ability to relate to humankind in general, and biblical writers in 
particular, directly and univocally within space and time.9 I am not 
implying that it is possible to conceive the being of God as univocal to 
our space and time.1° Equivocity and analogy are also needed." Here I 
'This is not the place to discuss further all the theological ramifications of changing 
from a timeless to a historical-temporal understanding of God's being and action. Such a 
task would entail a total revision of traditional, mcdern, and postmodern traditions in the 
philosophical, methodological, and theological levels. 
9A team of evangelical authors has recently explored the possibility of thinking 
theologically about God on the basis of biblical concepts (Clark Pinnock and others, The 
Qmmaess of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God [Downers 
Grove: InterVarsity, 19941). Generally speaking, as far as it challenges tradition and 
attempts to formulate the Christian doctrine of God by integrating more biblical concepts, 
the book moves in the right direction. Especially enlightening is John Sanders' chapter 
("Historical Considerations"), in which the development of the classical philosophical- 
biblical synthesis of the understanding of God is clearly outlined. Unfortunately, the book 
falls short of harmoniously incorporating all biblical data (notably, in the case of divine 
foreknowledge) or grasping the radical theological implications involved in the biblical 
criticism of tradition. 
'"Process philosophy has been openly critical of the timeless conception of God. 
Alfred North Whitehead conceives God as open to the world and, therefore, to time. 
Whitehead's view of God assumes an univocal understanding of time specifically as he 
deals with the consequent nature of God (Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology [New 
York: Macmillan, 19291, 523-524). Charles Hartshorne seems to follow the same view, as 
he affirms that ". . . the divine awareness is concretely new each moment" (The Logic of 
Pe&-tion [LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 19621, 262). See also Charles Hartshorne, The Divine 
10 FERNANDO L. CANALE 
am maintaining only that when, following Scripture, one conceives God 
to be a historical temporal transcendent being, He is at least able to 
relate to human history and cognition univocally, that is, directly 
within the level of reality and cognition which properly belongs to 
human beings, namely, to our time and space." On the ground laid by 
this interpretation there appear to be no impediments to thinking of 
God along the lines presented in Scripture, as able to talk, speak, and 
act directly within the sphere of space and time. On this base a positive 
answer to the question about the possibility of revelation-inspiration can 
be formulated and a model for understanding the epistemological 
origination of Scripture built. 
- 
The second component of the presuppositional structure, namely, 
humanity and its cognitive capabilities, is also to be conceived 
temporally and historically. Thus, another fundamental condition for 
the possibility of revelation-inspiration is met. The divine-human 
process through which the contents of Scripture were generated 
demands that the originating and receiving minds meet and work within 
the same level of reality.13 In what pertains to the human component 
of the presuppositional structure, the historicist interpretation of 
knowledge followed by most modern and postmodern scholars comes 
closer to the biblical way of thinking. The limitation and inadequacy of 
the liberal model is not due to its conception of reason, but rather to 
Relativity: A Social Conception of God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 79; and 
Charles Hartshorne and Creighton Peden, Whitehead's View of Reality (New York: 
Pilgrim, 1981), 34, 73-79. An analogical conception of time in which equivocity and 
univocity are simultaneously integrated in the conception of the divine being seems absent 
in process philosophy. 
llPannenberg remarks that "in the history and development of the concept of 
analogy as an instrument for the extension of knowledge a core of univocity is thus a 
decisive premise even though analogous relations might be observed" (Systematic i%eology, 
1:344, n.14). In dealing with the concept of God the three modes of predication- 
univocity, equivocity, and analogy-have to be harmoniously utilized as they are in 
Scripture. 
'2According to Scripture, God's temporal-historical being is seen as acting in the 
lower level of human temporality. However, this scriptural conviction does not forfeit 
God's capability to be, to act, and to relate to human beings at other levels of temporality 
which would be either analogical or equivocal to human conception of time. 
13Emilio Betti properly remarks that communication between two minds by the 
means of "meaning-full" forms assumes a "congenial dispositionn ("Hermeneutics as the 
General Methodology of the Geisteswi~senschaften,~ in Contemporary Hmeneutics: 
Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique, ed. Josef Bleicher [London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 19801, 84-85). It is obvious that a "congenial dispositionn can occur only when 
both minds share the same level of reality and knowledge. 
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its inability to get rid of the timeless conception of a God that, being 
unable to act historically in human history, is also incapable of acting 
within the cognitive and linguistic levels of humanity." 
Summarizing, the liberal model conceives human nature in a way 
that comes closer to Scriptures than the classical understanding. At the 
same time, liberals specifically deny the possibility of a .cognitive 
interpretation of revelation-inspiration. This denial logically seems to 
follow from simultaneously adhering to a temporal-historical conception 
of human nature and to the classical timeless conception of God. It is 
not difficult to realize that if God and humanity are placed in different, 
incompatible levels of reality, cognitive communication between them 
becomes logically and ontologically impossible. 
Consequently, the historicism of modernity and postmodernity 
allows room only for human and natural agents to work and interact 
within the closed continuum of history. According to this trend of 
thought, the basic ground of meaning and understanding is supplied by 
history conceived as the material expression of the formal category of 
tradition.'' Recently, Delwin Brown has formulated a postmodern 
conception of tradition which he calls "constructive historicism," which 
is the process through which human traditions are transmitted and 
modified." This position directly results from the negative answer to 
the possibility of revelation and inspiration upheld by the liberal model 
and, consequently, is incompatible with the model I am proposing. 
The model gounded on the historical-temporal understanding of 
God's being and cognitive acts of revelation and on the temporal- 
historical view of the human agent as cognitive receptor of the divine 
activity could be designated as the "historical-cognitive model" of 
revelation-inspiration. The model I am suggesting is "hist~rical'~ because 
the ontological nature of the agents involved in the generation of 
Scripture, namely God and man, is temporal-historical. Likewise, the 
essence of the knowledge produced by the revelation-inspiration process 
is also temporal-historical. The model I am outlining is "cognitive" 
because the historical interpretation of the ontological and 
epistemological levels of the presuppositional structure provides the 
I4Pannenberg's theology is a clear and explicit example of this kind of limitation. 
See Systematic Theology, 1:384-396. 
l5Within a Heideggerian tradition, Hans-Georg Gadamer has argued in favor of the 
epistemological role of history as tradition (Truth and Method [London: Sheed & Ward, 
19751, 245-274). 
16Delwin Brown, Boundaries of Our Habitations: Tradition and Theological 
Construction (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 11 1-150. 
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necessary condition for knowledge to be generated by the divine being 
and received by the human agent. On this account the historical- 
cognitive model overcomes the limitations of the liberal model, which 
does not allow for a divine origination of cognitive contents, and of the 
classical model, which allows only for a timeless origination of revealed 
contents. Starting at the level of the presuppositional structure, 
therefore, the historical-cognitive model of revelation-inspiration 
decidedly departs from both the classical and the liberal models. 
3. Revelation in the Historical-cognitive Model 
Earlier in this series it has been argued that the task of interpreting 
the epistemological origin of Scripture involves the exploration of: 
(1) the process by which contents were originated in the mind of the 
biblical authors, and (2) the process through which these contents were 
expressed in either oral or written forms. It has also been asserted that, 
within this process, revelation corresponds to the origination of biblical 
contents, while inspiration corresponds to their oral and written 
expression." However, the actual detailed configuration of a model of 
revelation-inspiration rests on the interpretation of revelation made 
possible by the interpretation of the presuppositional structure. Within 
this methodological context I turn now to the description of how the 
main features of revelation would be understood according to the 
historical-cognitive model. 
Divine Activity 
The question at this point is: How did God proceed in the 
origination of the cognitive contents we find today written down in 
Scripture? The key to the answer, resounding from Scripture, is given 
to us in the introduction to Hebrews: "In the past God spoke to our 
forefathers through the prophets at many times [.lroXvppGq] and in 
various ways [.lroXvrp6.1ru~]" (1:1, NIV).l8 The phenomenological 
analysis of the phenomena of Scripture clearly confirms the variety of 
"Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: Method for a New Approach," 186-190. 
"All biblical quotations are from the NIV. Johann Albrecht Bengel remarks that 
"in many portions refers to the matter, in divers manners to the form" (Bengeli New 
Testament Commentary [Grand Rapids: Kregel, 19811, 2574). Richard Charles Henry 
Lenski further specifies that 'the first [adverb] refers to quantity-so rich the varied 
contents; the second to quality-so rich the variety of form" (The Intwpretation of the 
Epistle to the Hebrews and of the Epistle of James [Minneapolis: Augburg, 19661, 30). See 
also Randolph 0. Yeager, The Renaissance New Testament (Bowling Green, KY: 
Renaissance, 1976-1985), 16:80-81; and EDNT, 3:131, 133. 
biblical revelation.19 Variety, then, is a main characteristic of the 
historical-cognitive model. Allow me to underline this point by way of 
a brief reference to the classical and liberal models in relation to their 
corresponding presuppositional structures. When God is conceived in 
a timeless way, variety in the mode of communication cannot be 
properly predicated of his action. Neither can the divine action be 
conceived as occurring "in pans," involving both division and temporal 
succe~sion.~~ For this systematic reason the classical and liberal theories 
of revelation conceive Scripture in its entirety as produced by the same 
kind of divine activity. No variation in the divine mode of acting is 
contemplated, since variation is only a human reality. The same applies 
to the classical understanding of inspiration: God always proceeds in the 
same way, without variation. Unlike this conception, the temporal- 
historical view of God's being and actions allows the historical-cognitive 
model to conceive of God as acting and communicating directly 
throughout human history in a variety of ways, at different times. 
Briefly put, the variety of Scripture is not merely due to the actions of 
the human agent, but primarily generated by the sundry activities of the 
divine One. The historical-cognitive model of revelation and inspiration 
recognizes that God was capable of acting in various patterns as he 
engaged in the process of generating Scripture. 
What are some of the ways, modes of action, or patterns that God 
used in the epistemological constitution of Scripture? The classical 
model recognizes only one pattern of revelation: the intellectual 
disclosure of knowledge. God's activity was reduced to the cognitive 
level, intellectually conceived according to the Platonic-Aristotelian 
l9Even from a liberal perspective this is unmistakable. Paul Ricoeur identifies five 
different types of biblical writings: prophetic, narrative, prescriptive, wisdom, and hymnal 
discourses ("Herrniheutique de l'idie de rkilation," in Paul Ricoeur and others, La 
rhdation [Brussels: Facultb Universitaires Saint Louis, 19771, 17-34. 
"Consider, for instance, how the timeless eternity and simplicity of God affect 
Augustine's conception of the Word of God: "So you call us to understand the Word, 
God with you, 0 God, which is spoken eternally, and in which all things are spoken 
eternally. Nor is it the case that what was spoken is ended and that another thing is said, 
so that all things may at length be said: all things are spoken once and forever. Elsewise, 
there would already be time and change, and neither true eternity nor true immortality. 
. . . Therefore, no part of your Word gives place to another or takes the place of another, 
since it is truly eternal and immortal. Therefore you say once and forever all that you say 
by the Word, who is coeternal with you" (Confessions 11.7.9). It is apparent that 
Augustine's conception of God's timelessness and the concurrent simplicity of his Being 
totally destroys the idea that the Bible is actually the word of God in its specific and 
direct meanings. If God speaks all things "once and forever," the historical newness of 
biblical revelation is displaced to the level of historically and culturally conditioned 
utterances. 
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tradition. According to this pattern of revelation, God allowed eternal, 
timeless truth to be intellectually grasped by biblical writers. That 
action constituted the ground and content of propositional revelation. 
This position entails the view that not all contents of Scripture were 
epistemologically originated by God's action. On the contrary, large 
portions of Scripture were generated through the normal human process 
of intellection. Recognizing that not all excerpts of Scripture are 
revealed, inspiration is needed to safeguard the divine character of 
Scripture as a whole. Scripture would be partially revealed and totally 
inspired. The liberal model also recognizes one pattern or mode of 
divine revelation. Revelation is the existential, noncognitive, divine- 
human encounter. Its content is always the same. Variety comes only 
from the human side. The whole content of Scripture is generated by 
human beings. Of course these human beings have been "supernaturally 
touched," yet God's divine touch happens in the existential rather than 
cognitive or linguistic level. God does not originate nor provide the 
contents of Scripture. In this specific epistemological sense, then, the 
liberal model recognizes that no section of Scripture is either revealed 
or inspired. 
God's revelation, as it pertains to the cognitive origin of the 
contents of Scripture, belongs to the area of communication between 
two minds. According to Emilio Betti, the mind that originates the 
communication produces a variety of "meaning-full forms."21 When the 
human mind initiates the origination of meaning-full forms, these may 
include "from fleeting speech to fixed documents and mute remainders, 
from writing to chi,fres and to artistic symbol, from articulate language 
to figurative or musical representation, from explanation to active 
behaviour, from facial expression to ways of bearing and types of 
~haracter ."~~ Since in revelation the divine mind is capable of 
Z'Emilio Betti explains that "meaning-full formsn (sinnhaltige Formen) are "to be 
understood in a wide sense as an homogeneous structure in which a number of perceptible 
elements are related to one another and which is suitable for preserving the character of 
the mind that created it or that is embodied in it* ("Hermeneutics as the General 
Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften," 54). In his groundbreaking treatise on 
interpretation, Betti refers to "meaning-full formsn as "forma rappresentativa." "Forman 
is understood in the most general way as "di rapport0 unitario di elementi sensibili, 
idoneo a serbare I'impronta di chi l'ha foggiato o di chi lo incarna (es.: il viso di una 
persona)." While "rappresentativa" is understood "nel senso che attraverso la forma debba 
rendersi a noi riconoscibile, facendo appello alla nostra sensibiliti e intelligenza, un altro 
spirit0 diverso dal nostro e tuttavia intimamente affine al nostron (Teoria Generale della 
Intwpretazione [Milano: Dott. A. Giuffrk, 19901, 62). 
22Betti, "Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Gei~teswissenschaften,~ 53. 
See also Betti, Teoria Generale della Interpretazione, 60. 
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functioning not only according to the patterns proper to its own 
divinity, but also according to the lower ontological and epistemological 
levels of the intended recipient, it is logical to assume that any meaning- 
full form that can be produced by a human mind can also be created by 
the divine mind.23 Furthermore, because of his divine nature God is able 
to create meaning-full forms in patterns that fall outside the range of 
human cognition and action. Even then, however, God produces these 
forms of cognitive communication within the realm in which human 
cognition works: historically, within space and time. Thus, revelation 
assumes God's condescension and his ability to work directly within the 
lower level of human, historical cognition.24 
Human perception of God's activities and their patterns of 
meaning-full forms will always be limited, both for the original 
prophet25 and for any subsequent interpreter of prophetic utterances. 
Thus, it is impossible to reach full awareness of all the patterns in 
which God is able to act or has already acted in the epistemological 
origination of Scripture. Likewise, any attempt to determine with 
precision and finality which divine actions have contributed to the 
generation of the contents of each portion of Scripture seems futile. 
However, a proper understanding of revelation-inspiration requires the 
acknowledgement that various different divine activities may contribute 
to the origination of any passage of Scripture. 
The identification of the main .patterns utilized by God in the 
generation of Scripture cannot be rationally deduced from his nature 
but rather described from the phenomena of S ~ r i p t u r e . ~ ~  Some of the 
meaning-full forms utilized by God in the generation of Scripture are 
explicit in Scripture. For instance, we discover God presenting himself 
in history to human beings (theophanies; Exod 3:l-15; John 1:l-14), 
writing (Exod 31:18; Deut 9:10), speaking (Exod 20:l; Rev 19:9; Gen 
UThe liberal model recognizes that revelation is an act "from mind to mind," yet 
in revelation God does not act within the human level of cognition. The mind-to-mind 
encounter is not "a body of information concerning certain things about which we might 
otherwise be ignorant" or "information about God, but the very God Himself" (Jack W. 
Provonsha, "Revelation and History," A USS 2 [1964]: 11 1-1 12). See also Pannenberg, 
Systematic Theology, 1:241. 
24The concept of God's condescension is not new. For an exploration of divine 
condescension in the context of the doctrine of revelation-inspiration see Bernard Rarnm, 
Special Revelation and the Word of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1961), 31-52. 
25When employed without qualification, I use the term "prophet" as synonymous 
with "biblical writer," not in the specific sense of the writer of predictions. 
26By the expression "phenomena of Scripture," I am referring to the actual cognitive- 
linguistic contents of Scripture as we know them. 
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151; 20:3), giving visual representations (Isa 6:l-3; Ezek 43:3; Dan 7:2; 
Acts 10:9-17; 16:9; Rev 9:7), historically acting in history (Isa 43:18-19; 
46:ll; Dan 2:2l), and acting in relation to the life experience of an 
individual (Lam 3:l; Prov 1:7; Eccl 1:12;17)." All these divine activities 
produced, historically in history, meaning-full forms that communicated 
cognitive contents from the mind of God to the mind of the biblical 
author or prophet. These meaning-full forms are the epistemological 
origin of the ideas, contents, and information supplied to the mind of 
the biblical writer in the process of revelation, and also of the content 
of what he expresses in oral or written form. 
From what has been described thus far it seem reasonable to infer 
that God's production of meaning-full forms, as depicted in Scripture, 
allows for at least five main patterns of revelation. In order of 
decreasing cognitive specificity these are: theophanic, direct writing, 
prophetic, historical, and existential." No single pattern can, by itself, 
account for the richness and manifoldness of biblical revelation. 
Moreover, it is likely that in producing Scripture, God employed 
additional patterns which could be discovered through a careful 
phenomenological analysis of Scripture. Let me reiterate, variety in 
Scripture is not primarily caused by limitations in the human agent, but 
rather intentionally produced by the various patterns of divine 
revelatory a~tivity.'~ The multiplicity of patterns utilized by God in 
producing meaning-full forms allows the historical-cognitive model of 
27These biblical references are only a sample of biblical passages speaking to each 
divine activity. 
"Studying the Gospel of Luke, George E. Rice came to the conviction that the 
Bible was produced by two patterns or models, the prophetic and the "Lucan" models of 
inspiration (Luke, a Plagiarist? [Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1983],9-16). Rice's view 
challenges the classical approach that recognizes only one pattern of divine activity. 
Moreover, since Rice was not attempting to explain the epistemological origination of 
Scripture as a whole, but rather to contest the idea that the Gospel of Luke was produced 
only by way of the prophetic pattern, his conclusion does not preclude our contention 
that additional patterns have been involved in the generation of Scripture. 
29Abraham J. Heschel explores the prophetic experience from an Old Testament 
perspective. His study attempts to penetrate into the biblical view of the prophet's 
activity. Heschel, however, does not deal with the divine role in the origination of 
prophetic discourse with the detail, specificity, and faithfulness to biblical data I expected. 
In this matter, he seems to be under the influence of the liberal model. Heschel appears 
to be somewhat ambiguous on this facet of the prophetic experience. On one hand, he 
explicitly argues against the liberal idea of poetic inspiration (The Prophets [New York: 
Harper & Row, 19621, 145-169; for the poetic nature of biblical language see Ricoeur, 
"Hermkneutique de l'idke de rkvklation," 41-42). On the other hand, by the end of the 
book, Heschel's conclusions sound very much like those of the liberal model (265-268). 
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revelation-inspiration to extend the divine activity of revelation to the 
whole range of Scripture. 
Human Activity 
God's generation of meaning-full patterns does not per se originate 
either the actual contents or the letter of Scripture. Meaning-full 
patterns are concrete vehicles utilized to communicate divine meaning. 
Communication unavoidably requires more than the divine production 
of meaning-full patterns. Meaning must not only be originated but also 
received. The reception of meaning is performed by the human nature 
of the biblical writer, notably involving his cognitive capabilities. For 
the communication of meaning to occur, both communicator and 
receptor must work within the same cognitive parameters. After this 
necessary condition for the possibility of revelation is met, the role of 
the human receptor in relation to the constitution of the meaning 
received is to be ascertained. 
First, then, let us consider the requirement according to which 
both the originator and the recipient of the meaning-full forms must 
work within the same ontological and epistemological level for cognitive 
communication to occur. The presuppositional structure of the 
historical-cognitive model I am proposing understands man's capabilities 
to be essentially temporal and historical. There is no timeless agent 
intellect3' as assumed by the classical theory. Reason is not capable of 
reaching the realm of timeless truths.31 According to scripture, human 
nature is not the timeless substance, commonly known as soul, in 
which the rational capabilities are gro~nded.'~ As modernism and 
postmodernism also reject this position, they only come to recognize 
what was assumed all along in Scripture. Since, as explained above, God 
is capable of originating and constituting the meaning-full forms and 
patterns of revelation historically in history, that is, within the very 
same realm in which human reason normally functions, the basic 
condition for the cognitive communication between originating and 
receiving minds is met. 
30~ee Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Classical Model," 14, 20, 22, 26. 
"In this respect the historical-cognitive model follows the broad interpretation of 
human reason accepted by modernism and postmodernism. I am not suggesting, however, 
that the historical-cognitive model subscribes to any particular phdosophical interpretation 
of reason. Rather, I am saying that in their interpretation of the cognitive capabilities of 
man, modernism and postmodernism have come closer to the scriptural position than the 
classical model. 
320n this issue see, for instance, the concise but clear study by Oscar Cullmann: 
Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? (New York: Macmillan, 1958). 
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From this, an important consequence follows. In the reception of 
the divinely originated meaning-full patterns, the reason of the receiving 
agent, the prophet, does not require the supernatural elevation of its 
powers. The historical-cognitive model of revelation-inspiration, then, 
does not require the charismatic elevation of reason's faculties by the 
supernatural activity of the Holy Spirit. 
Even though in general terms it agrees with the liberal model on 
the understanding of human cognition, the historical-cognitive model 
differs from it even more than from the classical model because here a 
cognitive communication is accepted, whereas in the liberal model no 
cognitive communication is even possible. Departing from both the 
classical and liberal views, the historical-cognitive model accepts the 
biblical conception, according to which the communication involved in 
revelation-inspiration occurs not only within the cognitive but also 
within the temporal-historical level of reality, thereby not requiring a 
supernatural elevation of human reason either in revelation or 
inspiration. 
Let us now turn briefly our attention to the role that the human 
receptor plays in the process of revelation. Is the process of reception 
totally passive, thus adding or contributing nothing to the meaning-full 
patterns received? Or  is the reception also active, contributing to the 
very generation of the revealed ideas or contents? If the prophet's mind 
is active, not only in receiving, but also in contributing to the 
understand-ing of what is being transmitted, what is the nature of his 
contribution? 
Once the historical characteristics of the human receptor are 
recognized, a pivotal feature of the function of human cognition comes 
into view, namely, the content and origination of the rational a priori. 
A phenomenological description of the role of human cognition reveals 
that the apprehension of any given object involves not only a receptive, 
passive function, but also a creative, active one.33 The same dynamics are 
present in the reception of meaning-full forms created by another 
mind.34 Both the receptive and creative operations of reason are related 
to the a priori categories brought by the cognitive agent to the event of 
33This receptive-creative activity is a general characteristic of human knowledge 
(Nicolai Hartmann, Grundziige einer Metaphysik der Erkenntis [Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 
19411, 1.5.c.6). Abraham J. Heschel perceives that "the prophet is responsive, not only 
receptive" (The Prophets, 137). Thus the general characteristic of human cognition remains 
the same, even in the prophetic experience. 
"Betti, Teoriu generale della intwpretazione, 65, 
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re~ela t ion .~~ Without a priori categories the human mind cannot receive 
and process any meaning-full form. Thus, it is a matter not of whether 
the prophet had a priori categories, but rather of identifying their 
nature, origination, and content. 
In the classical model, a priori categories are timeless possessions 
of the nature of reason.36 They are not originated in history. Their 
content is formal rather than material, not provided by the life 
experience of the individual (Lebenswelt); it is rather an ensemble of 
general abstract principles, on the basis of which human reason is able 
to f~nction.~ '  
In the historical-cognitive model, however, the a priori categories 
are not grounded in timeless being or reason, but rather in the historical 
experience of the prophet with God's previous revelations in the 
Lebens~elt.~' These previous revelations may include what other biblical 
prophets have said and written and even personal revelations given by 
3 5 ~ t  is important to draw as clearly as possible the distinction between epistemology 
and hermeneutics. In this article epistemology refers to the study of the way human 
knowledge functions. Consequently, epistemology includes both theory of knowledge and 
philosophy of sciences. Hermeneutics is a closely related but somehow more limited 
enterprise. Hermeneutics studies the way we know other human beings indirectly through 
their multifarious expressions (see Bleicher, 90). Hermeneutics, then, studies the way we 
know the productions of the human mind, while epistemology works with the human 
understanding in general and in relation to the objects of the world. There is a great deal 
of overlapping between epistemology and hermeneutics because epistemology produces 
human expressions which the development of any science needs to include. 
36This is not the appropriate place to discuss the categories or their origination. 
Suffice it to  say that, following Aristotle, the grounding of timeless categories in the 
classical model is ontological rather than epistemological as in Kant (Metaphysics 5.7; 7.1; 
9.1; Critique of Pure Reason, 60-67). 
37After enumerating the various nontechnical and technical connotations given to 
the term "category," Josi Ferrater Mora explains that in the traditional opinion, 
maintained not only by scholastic thinkers but also by modern historians of philosophy, 
"las categorfas expresanflexiones o casos del ser y pueden, por consiguiente, ser definidas 
como gheros supremos de las cosas, suprema rerum genera" (Dicciomrio de Filosofia [Buenos 
Aires: Sudamericana, 19651, 1:265. Even though Aristotle hesitated to define the precise 
number of categories, he recognizes all sorts of categories, as many as the connotations 
we can find in the entity (oiala) (Metaphysics 5.7), yet the number of categories is not 
infinite (Posterior Amlytics 1.22.15 [83 b]. 
38Even in philosophy there is an increasing recognition that categories come from 
previous experience in historical-natural reality (Edrnund Husserl, Logical Investigations 
[New York: Humanities, 19701, 6, 8, 960). 
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God to the prophet in his or her past e~perience.)~ The a priori 
categories necessary for the reception and interpretation of the given 
object or meaning-full form come from the past into the present and 
future.40 This movement corresponds to the flow of meaning in 
temporal rea~on.~' In other words, the a priori categories that the 
prophet needs in order to understand what is being communicated by 
way of the meaning-full forms created by God originate in the past life 
experience of the prophet. This past experience is directly instrumental 
in enabling the prophet to receive the meaning God is communicating 
in the present by way of the meaning-full patterns of re~elation.'~ 
However, the historical origination and content of the a priori 
categories, which the prophet brings to the cognitive event of 
revelation, are not to be identified with changing human culture, as is 
done in the liberal model. 
Since concrete human experiences are never identical, the actual 
content of the a priori categories in the mind of biblical authors varied 
greatly. This brings up the issue of whether theological pluralism is to 
be recognized at the very inception of biblical contents. Were the 
meaning-full forms originated by God interpreted by cultural, 
39Heschel sees the prophet as "homo sympathetikos" (88). The prophet has a 
"sympathetic solidarity with God" (91). I think that Heschel's "homo sympathetikos" 
describes the prophetic a priori, yet a complete epistemological account of the origination 
of Scripture requires that the prophet's "sympathetic solidarity with God" should include 
not only feelings but, primarily, the presuppositional structure and doctrines generated 
by previous revelations. 
40Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1976), 9. 
4'Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls this historical conception of the cognitive a priori 
"thickness" (Phenomenology of Perception [Atlantic Highlands: New Press, 19641, 433. See 
also Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper, 1962), 2.5.75 and 76. Cf. 
William E. Reiser, "An Essay in the Development of Dogma in a Heideggerian Context: 
A Nontheological Explanation of Theological Heresy," Thomist 39 (1975): 475. Contrary 
to the past-to-present-and-future movement of historical reason, the historical-critical 
method of exegesis interprets the past in terms of the present (Ernest Troeltsch, 
Gesammelte Schr$en, vol. 2, Zur religiosen Lage, Religionphilosophie und Ethik [Tiibingen: 
Scientia Verlag Aden, 19221, 729-753; Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 2 vols. 
[New York: Harper and Row, 19621, 1: 107, n. 3). 
"This dynamic was utilized by Jesus himself when after the resurrection he 
undertook the task of explaining the events of his crucifixion and resurrection (Luke 
24:25-49). 
historically conditioned categories, as maintained by the liberal model?') 
As I will return to the concept of historical conditionality of biblical 
writings in the next section, suffice it to say that the historical-cognitive 
model of revelation-inspiration does not see the historical generation of 
the prophet's a priori categories as leading to either a theological 
pluralism or an acceptance of the historical conditionality of biblical 
writings. 
The concrete history of the biblical author chronologically and 
logically precedes the process of revelation-inspiration. That history 
shapes both what the prophet is and the content of his or her cognitive 
categories. However, the historical existence and experience of the 
prophet is always chronologically and logically preceded by divine 
revelation already in possession of the community of faith either in an 
oral or written form." In other words, the category-forming history of 
the ~rophet  is not independent but rather dependent on God's previous . 
revelation." It is not by chance that Isaiah, seemingly working within 
the historical-cognitive model, clearly stated that in evaluating claims to 
supernaturally originated discourse the criteria are unmistakable: "To 
the law and to the testimony! If they [mediums and spiritists] do not 
speak according to this word, they have no light of dawn" (8:20). The 
assumption, very logical indeed, is that God does not contradict himself 
in the communication of revelation through his prophets. In other 
words, an accurate evidence that a prophet is introducing privately 
originated ideas becomes apparent when his or her spoken or written 
words contradict previously stated divine revelation. 
A God who is able to act historically in history is, for that precise 
reason, also able to influence the historical development of the prophet 
and his or her cognitive categories without forcing freedom and 
independence. The prophet experiences providential, divine guidance in 
4 3 ~ y  "theological pluralismn I mean the idea that in Scripture we find different 
theologies not always compatible among themselves. A classical example of this may be 
Luther's difficulty to integrate James' theology with Paul's. James and Paul, it is suggested, 
just had incompatible views on the role works play in salvation. Hence, theological 
pluralism in Scripture. 
#"The inspiration of the prophet is distinguished, not only by an awareness of its 
source and of a will to impart the content of inspiration, but also by the coherence of the 
inspired messages as a whole (with their constant implication of earlier communications), 
by the awareness of being a link in the chain of the prophets who preceded him, and by 
the continuity which links the revelations he receives one to another. The words that 
come to him form a coherence of closely related revelations, all reflecting the illumination 
and the sense of mission shed by the call. There is both a thematic and a personal unity 
of experience" (Heschel, 169). 
45Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 1:206. 
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the development of his or her a priori cognitive categories. This divine 
education-a concrete, historical form of education, understood in the 
broadest possible meaning of the word-embraces the whole life span 
of the prophet. On this ground, it is possible to understand that even 
when no two prophets interpret the divinely originated meaning-full 
forms with the same a priori categories (life experience), no theological 
pluralism follows because the variety in the content of their a priori 
experiences is not systematic or doctrinal, but rather cultural and 
personal.46 
A specific distinction between the kinds of a priori categories the 
prophet brings to the event of revelation needs to be drawn. The 
historical experience of any human being includes a variety of different 
facets which cannot be compressed into an undifferentiated whole. 
Among the many aspects included in the life experiences of any human 
being, five play a decisive role in the cognitive process. In order of 
importance, the five levels always present in the prophet's a priori are: 
presuppositional structure, doctrinal conceptions, sociocultural idiosyn- 
crasies, personal life experiences, and individual personal traits. All of 
them are always present in the constitution of meaning, including the 
specific experience of the prophet receiving and interpreting divinely 
originated meaning-full forms. 
Because of the logical and chronological priority of revelation over 
the life experiences of the prophet and the historical involvement of 
God in the development of the prophet's historically generated a priori 
categories, it is reasonable to assume that biblical writers developed, 
9 e e  note 41 above. Hans Kiing, quoting Ernst Kasemann's view that in the New 
Testament "we have to confirm the presence not just of considerable tensions but often 
too of irreconcilable theological contradictions" (Begrundet der neutestamentliche Kanon 
die Einheit dm Kirche? Exegetische Vwsuche und Besinnungen I [1960], 218, in Hans Kiing, 
Theology for the Third Millennium: An Ecumenical View [New York: Doubleday, 19881, 
66), recognizes the existence of a "partially manifest incompatibility of the theological 
positions in the New Testament" (ibid.). James Dunn seems to come close to this same 
position as he concludes that a comparison of thought patterns in the New Testament 
reveals that they by no means "always complemented each other; on the contrary, they 
not infrequently clashed, sometimes fiercely" (Unity and Diversity in the New Testament: 
An Inquiry Into the Character of Earliest Christianity [Philadelphia: Westminster, 19771, 
372; cf. ibid., Jesus and the Spirit: A Study of the Religious and Charismatic Experience of 
Jesus and the First Christians as Reflcted in the New Testament [London: SCM, 19751, 359). 
Without in any way denying the diversity that Kasemann, Kiing, and Dunn perceive in 
Scripture, one wonders whether viewing theological contradictions and clashes in Scripture 
is not due to replacing the biblical interpretation of the presuppositional structure with 
philosophical and scientific principles. When theology is interpreted on the basis of the 
biblical interpretation of the presuppositional structure, it is possible to see how the 
diversity present in Scripture does not involve competing or contradicting theological 
positions. 
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through the divinely guided historical process of education, a common 
understanding of the first two facets of the a priori-the presupposi- 
tional structure and doctrinal teachings. At the same time, they differed 
greatly at the sociocultural and personal levels. In this way we can 
explain the general theological harmony throughout Scripture and at the 
same time the rich diversity of concepts and manners of expression 
present in Scripture. Thus, the a priori condition for the understanding 
of God's historically generated meaning-full forms was developed not in 
isolation from God, but rather under his direct and pervasive influence. 
In this way the a priori categories required for a harmonious and 
noncontradictory understanding of God's multifarious patterns of 
revelation were worked out in the life and mind of the prophet. 
Awareness that the human agent was not only a passive receptor 
but also an active contributor in the generation of the revealed content 
as explained above might have been one reason for Peter's somewhat 
enigmatic clarification that ~ & a a  ~poc#qr~la! ypa+ijc iGlac iniX6aewc oir 
ylv~rai (2 Pet 1:20).47 Because the human agent is actively involved, not 
only receiving but also interpreting the divinely originated meaning-full 
form patterns of revelation, Peter makes clear that such a contribution 
does not involve the private, independently originated, subjective 
opinions of the biblical writer. As already explained, the a priori 
categories through which the prophet received and interpreted the 
meaning-full patterns generated by God are grounded in previously 
given and consciously accepted revealed contents. 
The Essence or Nature of Revelation 
According to the historical-cognitive model, the essence of 
revelation is cognitive. Revelation is the communication of knowledge 
from God to humankind through the prophet. In this general sense the 
historical-cognitive model agrees with the classical model, yet the former 
departs from the latter in the way the essence of knowledge is 
interpreted. According to the historical-cognitive model, the nature of 
the cognition involved in revelation is temporal and hi~torical .~~ 
47A. C. Thiselton presents a brief description of scholarly interpretations of this 
Petrine statement (";?TLA~u," NIDNTT 1:578-579). 
48The temporal-historical understanding of knowledge is not restrictive but rather 
inclusive of all human experiences, including personal feelings and moods (see Heidegger's 
discussion of mood as state-of-mind [Being and Time, 172-1791. David Tracy describes the 
broad way in which I am using the word "cognition" here in reference to the concept of 
understanding. To know (cognition) is to understand, and to understand is to interpret. 
In its broad sense interpretation includes experience, understanding, deliberation, 
judgment, decision, and action (Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope [San 
Francisco: Harper and Row, 19871, 9). Thus interpreted, human cognition is able to 
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The historical-cognitive conception of the essence of revelation 
logically follows from the preceding interpretation of the divine and 
human activities involved in the process of revelation outlined above. 
It seems clear that the essence of revelation as cognition corresponds to 
the essence of human rather than divine cognition. The lower is not 
capable of the higher but the higher is capable of the lower. 
The traditional concept of God's condescension applies here. 
Adaptation to the parameters of human cognition is possible because, 
according to the historical-cognitive model, God is able to act directly 
within the lower level of space and time. Through his condescension, 
he is able to enter into and share directly in the characteristics of space 
and time, both ontologically and epistemologically. God's revelation, 
then, is produced by acquiescing to the main characteristics of human 
cognition, as it is interpreted historically. At the same time, this entry 
of God into the lower level of human cognition becomes the very 
ground for the essence of revelation as cognitive event. As Heidegger 
puts it, human cognition originates when past experience and openness 
to the future coalesce into a moment of vision.49 In the case of the 
prophet, God, by his continuous and direct historical presence and 
activity within the spatial-temporal parameter of human history, sets the 
concrete historical content of the prophet's past recollection and future 
openness. Thus, in the moment of vision, the prophet, through the 
possession of previously originated categories, receives and interprets the 
meaning-full forms created by God. 
It follows that the mode of cognition involved in the epistemolo- 
gical origination of Scripture is not divine and, therefore, absolutely 
~erfect, but rather human, including all the limitations and imperfec- 
tions of the human mode of cognition.50 It is important to underline 
that here I am referring to the mode of the revealed contents and not 
include the personal and existential aspects of the divine-human encounter. The 
sometimes-called "incarnational" understanding of revelation does not happen without, but 
rather within, the general realm of human experience. And human experience is never 
independent from knowledge. 
49"Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is freefor its death 
and can let itself be thrown back upon its factical 'thereJ by shattering itself against death-that 
is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having-been, 
can, by handing d m  to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its oum t h r m e s s  and 
be in the moment of vision for :its time. ' Only authentic temporality which is at the same 
time finite, makes possible something like fate--that is to say, authentic historicality" (Being 
and Time 2.5.74, emphasis original). 
50As an example of a description of the essential limitedness and 
incompleteness of historical cognition, see Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction 
to Pure Phenomenology (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963, 137-138. 
REVELATION-INSPIRATION: HISTORICAL-COGNITIVEMODEL 25 
to the contents themselves. Neither the truth nor the divine origination 
of biblical contents is contradictory to the affirmation of the human 
mode of cognition through which biblical revelation was generated. 
If one accepts that the mode in which the epistemological 
origination of biblical contents took place is that of human cognition 
as historically interpreted, a further departure from the classical and 
liberal models is inevitable. The process of revelation that brought 
Scripture into existence can no longer be conceived as historically 
conditioned. The essence of revelation rather resides in its historical 
constitution. Thus, I come back to a rather complex issue mentioned in 
the first article of this series. A rigorous exploration of its intricacy 
would lead us far beyond the purpose and limits of this essay. However, 
since this distinction belongs to the essence of revelation according to 
the historical-cognitive model, a preliminary clarification is in order. 
The historical consciousness developed in Western philosophical 
and scientific circles since the Enlightenment has influenced Christian 
theology to the point that, without much technical explanation, the 
historical conditionality of Scripture is accepted as an irrefutable fact by 
both classical and liberal theologians. When the contents of Scripture 
are conceived as historically conditioned, the historical-critical method 
of biblical interpretation appears to be better suited to a scientifically 
sound and theologically rewarding reading of Scripture. Let us inquire 
briefly into the meaning of historical conditionality. 
The classical and liberal models view the contents of Scripture as 
historically conditioned. The understanding of what "historically 
conditioned" means requires a clear awareness of the epistemological 
configuration of both models. At this point a review of my description 
of classical and liberal models may prove helpful.51 On this basis a brief 
explanation describing the theological position encapsulated in the 
"historically conditioned" qualification of Scripture may suffice for 
comparison with the "historical constitution" of Scripture espoused by 
the historical-cognitive model. 
A condition differs from a cause in that the latter has the positive 
sense of being that on the basis of which something happens or comes 
into being, while the former has the negative undertone of being that 
without which something would not come to pass.52 This definition 
means that both the cause and the condition need to be present to 
produce a given result. 
"see Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Classical Model," and "Revelation 
and Inspiration: The Liberal Model." 
"Ferrater Mora, 1:329. 
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Classical and liberal models of revelation-inspiration designate the 
temporal-historical level of reality as condition, while the timeless 
activity of God-cognitive or existential-is given the role of cause. The 
classical Platonic dualistic epistemology is at work here setting the 
parameters of this distinction. Plato, in a very subtle way, is still 
exercising his influence in classical and modern theology by 
imperceptibly determining the interpretation of the presuppositional 
framework of both models. In short, the temporal and historical do not 
belong to the essence of revelation-inspiration, but only to the process 
of its expression, which does not form part of the content of 
revelation.53 Viewing Scripture in this light requires that the historical 
level be methodologically disregarded in order to accede to the imagined 
ultimate cause or meaning, which always stands beyond the historical 
realm.54 
In-conceiving the essence of revelation-inspiration to be historically 
constituted, the historical-cognitive model departs from the historical 
conditionality of Scripture. - The historical constitution of biblical 
thinking andcontents lbgically follows from the interpretation of divine 
and human activities. To put it briefly, meaning is constituted, 
generated, and originated within the parameters proper to the nature of 
human thought when historically interpreted. When the essence of the 
mode of knowledge in which the epistemological origination of biblical 
thinking came to pass is understood historically, exegetes and 
theologians do not need to look beyond the apparent historical 
meanings of biblical words by imagining the existence of a timeless 
referent beyond the text and thereby replacing interpretation with 
imagination. 
- 
The historical constitution of meaning came to pass as God, in his 
wisdom and love, making use of his power, reached into the lower level 
of human historical reality and cognition (divine condescension). Once 
53Theologians such as Rudolf Bultmam think that prophets used the ideology and 
scientific information available to them as external vehicles for the expression of timeless, 
transcendent revelation. Within this frame of mind, Bultmann argues that the concept of 
h&yoq in the prologue to the Gospel of John could not have been taken from the Old 
Testament, but rather from Gnosticism and its Platonic antecedent (The Gospel of John: 
A Commentary [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 19711, 19-36). In this view, biblical data are freely 
borrowed from the culture of the times, the only available historically conditioned vehicle 
to express in human words the revelation of the timelessly conceived God. 
54Even in scholars committed to the exegetical discovery of truth in the text of 
Scripture, the acceptance of the historical conditionality of Scripture leads to its historical 
relativity and, consequently, to the relativity of its authority; see, for instance, James 
Dunn, "The Authority of Scripture According to Scripture," Churchman 96 (1982): 
212-214. 
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within this level, God originated meaning-full forms that were grasped 
by the historical cognition of the prophet, which included his or her a 
priori categories. From the conjunction and contribution of both divine 
originator and human receptor the content of revelation came to 
existence in the mind of the prophet. The result was a historically 
constituted revelation which, through the additional process of 
inspiration (see below), became a historically constituted text. The 
referent of a historically constituted text is always found within the 
general parameters of space and time. All the intelligibilities captured 
within the historically constituted text, including the limitations and 
contributions of the human agents, are the content of revelation and the 
source of theological data. 
The Content of Revelation 
The historical-cognitive model of revelation maintains that the 
epistemological origination of biblical contents was produced by the 
conjunct activity of God and man. God originated various patterns of 
meaning-full forms within the historical parameters proper to human 
existence and knowledge. Chosen men and women received and 
simultaneously interpreted the God-given meaning-full forms by means 
of the necessary a priori categories which were historically generated 
and shaped by the prophet's willful reception of God's prior revelations. 
Thus conceived, revelation is at the inception of all biblical contents. The 
whole content of Scripture is revealed by God. 
This affirmation is possible when the idea of God's cognitive 
activities is broadened from one fixed pattern to include a variety of 
patterns which, in their ampleness, are able to account for the divine 
origination of the entire Scripture. At the same time, the idea of variety 
in revelatory patterns entails variety in revealed contents and ideas. It 
is not difficult to see that the historical-cognitive model calls for a broad 
variety in the thought content and issues addressed in Scripture. The 
content of Scripture, therefore, cannot be understood in the singular but 
in the plural. We do not have "a content," but rather an amazingly rich 
"variety of contents." Likewise, the contents of Scripture do not refer 
to eternal timeless truths or existential encounters, but rather address 
the historical reality of God in direct relation to creation and sinful 
human history. Notably, the contents of Scripture include the 
multifarious aspects of the truths God conveyed in biblical revelation, 
including the whole historical development, unfolding from creation to 
new creation. 
Finally, the written content of revelation, which coincides with the 
entire extent of Scripture from Genesis to Revelation, is to be seen as 
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a brief summary of revelation. The classical and liberal models view 
Scripture as an exaggerated enlargement of an otherwise very simple and 
succinct essential cognitive or existential content. According to these 
theories, much of Scripture does not directly belong to the essential 
content of revelation. John seems to disagree with these theories. At the 
end of his Gospel he states the obvious: "Jesus did many other things 
as welln (John 21:25). These many other things are not recorded in 
John's Gospel, but were known either by John or other disciples. John 
clearly understood that the range of meaning-full forms created by the 
theophanic-historical pattern of Jesus' life overflowed the capability of 
thinking and writing of all possible writers. John continues: "If every 
one of them were written down, I suppose that even the whole world 
would not have room for the books that would be written." 
Undoubtedly, these books would include both the "acts of Jesus," 
which constituted the meaning-full forms given to the disciples, and the 
interpretation unavoidably originated by their reception. Scripture is, 
therefore, a compact synthesis of revelation. Instead of searching for an 
essential meaning behind the words of Scripture, openly disregarding the 
compressed summary of revelation given in the whole of Scripture, 
theologians and believers should be attentive and submissive to its 
whole content as historically generated, conceived, and expressed. 
4. Inspiration in the Historical-cognitive Model 
Throughout this series of articles, inspiration has been defined as 
the process by means of which the contents generated by revelation 
were given an oral or written formulation. The fact that human authors 
were directly involved in the production of Scripture is uncontestable. 
However, Peter reminds us that ; rb  rvebParo5 &$OU $ x p 6 p e v ~ ~  
lX&Xsaav (urh BeoG &vBpwroi (2 Pet 1:21). Totally agreeing with Peter, 
Paul reaffirms the basic Christian idea that God did not leave the 
prophets to write by themselves. On the contrary, because r & a a  ypa++ 
Bebrveuaro~ (2 Tim 3:16; cf. 2 Pet 1:21), God is to be recognized as 
directly involved in the writing of Scripture. Since the term "God- 
breathed" involves a general concept which "does not imply any 
particular mode of inspiration," the mode or pattern of divine interven- 
tion in the writing of Scripture remains open to theological inquiry.55 
The Role of Divine Activity in Inspiration 
The interpretation of the role played by the divine agency logically 
and methodologically depends on the previous grounding revelation 
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event. In other words, according to the historical-cognitive model, the 
interpretation of inspiration is founded on the process of revelation 
rather than on a direct intervention of God in the process of writing, 
which would thus bypass or minimize revelation. The process of 
inspiration is subordinated to the process of revelation and its cognitive 
outcome. Thus, God's role in inspiration is never his first and sole 
intervention in the process of generating Scripture. The process of 
writing is not one through which contents are originated, but rather 
they are communicated to a larger audience. Inspiration releases 
revelation from the cognitive confines of the mind of the prophet into 
a new ontological realm, namely, that of the written 
Having restated this working distinction, I must point out that the 
process of writing simultaneously involves the process of thinking. It is 
impossible to write without at the same time being engaged in thinking. 
The thinking that occurs while one writes is not always memory- 
driven, but involves also the creation and generation of new ideas and 
contents. Consequently, it seems that it is not always possible to draw 
a clear line of demarcation between revelation and inspiration. In other 
words, sometimes revelation and inspiration may occur simultaneously. 
Yet, the essence of their processes is different: That of revelation is 
cognitive, while that of inspiration is linguistic. 
Because the historical-cognitive model acknowledges God's direct 
involvement in the generation of the contents of Scripture as a whole, 
the process of writing does not need to add, modify, or upgrade what 
has already been constituted through the process of revelation. On the 
contrary, God's contributions to the process of writing may be 
conceived as including two main patterns: (1) a general historical 
supervision pattern embracing the entire Scripture and (2) an occasional, 
remedial, corrective, historical-intervention pattern. 
Through his omniscience and omnipresence God is directly aware 
of everything, including the thought process and linguistic activities of 
the prophets. Divine awareness and specific knowledge of what is going 
on in the mind of the prophet and in his or her linguistic operations 
correspond to the general historical supervision pattern of God's 
inspiration. It represents a nonintrusive yet direct overview of the entire 
process of writing Scripture. This pattern is the necessary condition for 
''~aul Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in  Hermeneutics, 11 (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1991), 106-110; Josk Severino Croatto, Biblical 
Hermeneutics: Toward a Theory of Reading as the Production of Meaning (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis, 1987), 16-17. 
30 FERNANDO L. CANALE 
the various occurrences of the occasional direct remedial-corrective 
pattern. 
God's specific historical interventions in the process of 
proclaiming divine revelation in an oral or written form are designed to 
ensure three things: (1) that the prophet remains God's representative, 
not replacing God's contents with his or her own interpretations or 
ideas; (2) that the prophet is assisted in finding the most fitting way to 
communicate revealed truth; and (3) that, on the basis of the simul- 
taneity of writing and thinking, new ideas are originated during the 
actual process of writing. Only in notable circumstances did God's 
occasional intervention totally overrule the prophet's disc~urse.'~ 
Generally, however, God's occasional interventions had the purpose of 
enhancing the linguistic expressions of the prophet. 
Because of the absence of biblical reflection or examples of the way 
biblical prophets experienced divine guidance in the moment of writing, 
it seems advisable that caution should be eltercised in what we affirm on 
this issue. Because of this fact, it seems logical to conclude that any 
attempt to analyze the biblical text with the purpose of identifying 
God's historical interventions in the process of inspiration, as well as 
the occasions on which they took place, will render only fruitless 
speculative results. Additionally, it is probable that even the prophet 
was not specifically aware of God's occasional supernatural intervention, 
which might have been perceived, from the human viewpoint, as 
natural occurrences in the process of writing: for instance, remembering 
something, understanding an already-possessed information in a new 
light, or even coming up with a specific pivotal expression in the flow 
of thought. 
God's occasional, direct, remedial-corrective interventions, 
however, should not be conceived as ways by which God overrode the 
essential characteristics of the human modes of cognition and language 
so as to eliminate their limitedness, indeterminacy, ambiguity, 
impreciseness, or inaccuracy. Overriding the essential characteristics of 
the modes of human cognition and language would render impossible 
God's willful condescension to communicate within human parameters. 
57A clear, and even extreme, example of God's occasional specific intervention in 
which the prophet's initiative was totally overridden appears in the case of Balaam (Num 
22-24). In this incident God had to override the complete discourse of the prophet because 
of his rebellious intention. The prophet was aware of both God's general, permanent 
historical supervision and his pattern of occasional interventions. Balaam knew that his 
purpose was so contrary to God's expressed will and intention that drastic divine 
intervention was unavoidable (Num 22:38). 
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On the basis of the grounding process through which God 
generated the whole contents of Scripture (2 Tim 3:16; 2 Pet 1 2 1 )  and 
of the two interrelated patterns of God's contributions to the process 
of inspiration-God's permanent historical supervision and occasional 
direct historical interventions-the historical-cognitive model maintains 
that the whole of Scripture is revealed and inspired. 
As in the case of revelation, inspiration also results from God's 
multifarious historical activities. In proposing that God's involvement 
in the process of writing Scripture followed at least two major patterns, 
the historical-critical model departs from the classical model, which 
conceives inspiration under only one pattern of divine activity, a 
uniform, constant, and charismatic intervention intended to elevate the 
linguistic-cognitive capabilities of the writer. 
The Role of Human Activity in Inspiration 
The process of writing Scripture followed all the general modes 
and patterns proper to human speech and language, thus harmoniously 
corresponding to the cognitive essence, modes, and patterns of 
revelation. Additionally, the actual writing of Scripture necessarily 
integrated the characteristics corresponding to the specific languages 
employed. Not only did divine activities cover the entire scope of the 
literary production of Scripture; direct and constant human activity was 
also continuously present throughout the same process. Thus, the 
historical-cognitive model of revelation-inspiration maintains that the 
inspiration of Scripture is, in its entirety, a divine-human process. It is 
possible to state, then, that Scripture is fully divine and fully human.18 
As in the case of revelation, the historical-cognitive model of 
revelation-inspiration does not require a charismatic supernatural 
elevation of human writing capabilities to make prophets "super 
writers," thus overcoming the normal limitations of human language 
and writing. God speaks to us directly in human language and by means 
of a human book. The words of the prophets, in their entirety, are the 
words of God; yet the words in which God speaks to us are human 
and, therefore, involve the limitations of the human modes of language 
58The analogy between the incarnation of Christ in a human body and that of God 
in Scripture is of little help in understanding either incarnation. Affirming the analogy 
between Christ and Scripture as incarnations of God requires that the same interpretation 
of the presuppositional structure be utilized in both. In the case of Scripture the fully 
divine and fully human nature belong to the epistemological realm. In the case of Christ, 
the same affirmation corresponds to the deeper, grounding, ontological level. For a brief 
discussion of the way Karl Barth utilized this analogy and its repercussions for his 
understanding of Scripture, see Frank Hasel, "The Christological Analogy of Scripture in 
Karl Barth," 7 2  50 (1994): 41-49. 
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and writing. God speaks to us in various ways, all of them embedded 
within the characteristics and limitations of human thought and 
language. That is precisely the only way in which he could and can 
speak to us. The production of Scripture required that the divine 
intelligence, belonging to a higher ontological level and working within 
a higher epistemological mode, should enter the lower level in which 
the recipient of the divinely originated process of communication 
functions. Therefore, the thought patterns of God and his divine, 
transcendent, perfect language are not represented in Scripture.19 
However, due to the fact that God generated Scripture through the 
interrelated process of revelation-inspiration, in spite of their humanly 
limited modes the historically originated contents of Scripture are 
directly, in their plain historical meaning, the word of God. 
The Essence of Inspiration 
The essence of inspiration consists in the historic-linguistic process 
by means of which the cognitive contents generated by the divine- 
human process of revelation were put into writing. Consequently, the 
essence of inspiration also involves the harmonious working together of 
the divine and human agencies. This "working togethern of God and 
prophet, present in both revelation and inspiration, is to be conceived 
along the lines of historical interrelations or, in biblical terminology, 
" K O L Y ~ U ~ Q ! . " ~ ~  
This personal, historical understanding of the way in which the 
divine and human agents work in the inspiration of Scripture 
significantly departs from the supernatural charismatic conception of the 
classical model. It is true that by way of conceiving inspiration as the 
"concur~ive," simultaneous," "confluent," and/or "harmonious" coming 
together of divine and human activities the classical model did its best 
to recognize and accommodate the contribution of the human agency. 
However, the predestinational mode in which the divine activity was 
understood systematically affects the claims made regarding inspiration. 
A timeless God who is conceived to act-inspire-according to the 
general pattern of predestination or primary cause unavoidably reduces 
59Ellen G. White, Selected Messages (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1958), 
1:21-22. 
602 am referring here to ~otvwvia! in one of its basic connotations, that of sharing in 
a close personal relationship, understood in the sense of the related verb ~orvwvEw--"to 
share, have a share in, participate in," which gives the idea of possessing together, having 
a share, joining oneself to someone else 0. Schattenrnann, "~o~vwvla!," N I D N n ,  1:639, 
644). This is the biblical designation for divine-human communications in their most 
general connotation. 
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the real scope of human contribution in inspiration to its minimal 
possible expression and, at the same time, practically eliminates the 
personal nature of the "working together" proposed by the historical- 
cognitive model. 
The Content of Inspiration 
According to the historical-cognitive model, inspiration is co- 
extensive with revelation. Since the content and information of 
Scripture are originated through the divine-human process of revelation, 
the content of inspiration corresponds to the content of revelation. The 
content of inspiration, therefore, involves the whole of Scripture and 
the words in which they are expressed. It follows, then, that all the 
words of Scripture are the direct result of the combined and interrelated 
process of revelation and inspiration. All the words of Scripture are 
revealed and inspired. In this way the historical-cognitive model 
understands Paul's conviction that ~ & a a  ypcx$$ 8 ~ 6 . r r v ~ v a r o ~  (2 Tim 
3:16). 
5. Implications for Theology 
The historical-cognitive model has broad consequences for the way 
in which Scripture should be understood as source of theological data. 
Some of the most salient implications relate to the nature, scope, 
exegetical methodology, theological interpretation, and subordinate and 
limited role of extrabiblical sources of theological data. 
The nature of theological data is linguistic-cognitive and historical 
because God is understood to communicate directly within the level of 
general and personal history. In other words, the nature of Scripture as 
source of theological data is linguistic-cognitive and historical because 
God, acting historically in human history, has generated its cognitive 
content utilizing the modes, characteristics, and limitations of human 
cognition and language. 
The first implication leads to the affirmation of the tota Scriptura 
principle as the second ramification of the historical-cognitive model. 
This repercussion refers to the scope of theological data vis-ivis the 
total content of Scripture. Since God is directly involved in the entirety 
of the processes of revelation and inspiration, it follows that Scripture 
in its entirety becomes cognitively and linguistically the source of data 
for the constitution of Christian theology. Besides, the historical- 
cognitive model provides no foundation for any attempt to differentiate 
between levels, hierarchies, or degrees of inspiration or revelation within 
Scripture. There are no privileged or "more authoritative" sections of 
Scripture. Consequently, no canon within the canon is to be allowed to 
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produce an a priori dogmatic selection of relevant theological data. Any 
canon within the canon directly violates the tota as well as the sola 
Scriptura  principle^.^^ Variety of content and literary form becomes an 
integral part of the biblical data on which theology is to be built. 
The first two consequences require the formulation of an exegetical 
methodology that would allow Christian theologians to access the 
historically constituted meaning of the whole Scripture. The historical- 
grammatical and historical-critical methodologies depend on the same 
interpretations of the presuppositional structure that are at the 
foundation of the classical and liberal models, respectively. Therefore 
they are ill-prepared to process the entirety of scriptural data in their 
historically constituted essence.62 A new exegetical methodology should 
be conceived in harmony with the presuppositional structure of the 
historical-cognitive model. Therefore, it should be built along the lines 
of a historical, phenomenological approach to the text of S~ripture.~' 
6'Thus, even the suspicion that Paul had some sort of unconsciously formulated 
canon within the canon for the Old Testament, as E. P. Sanders suggests, seems hasty and 
motivated by a classical Protestant interpretation, not properly canceled out before 
approaching the text (Paul, the Lay, a d  the Jewish People [Philadelphia: Fortress, 19831, 
161-162). 
@In this regard a distinction between methodology and procedure is to be drawn. 
The historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods are demoted from methods to 
procedures because the presuppositional structure on which they traditionally functioned 
has been reinterpreted. As procedures they are necessary to reach the meaning of the text 
but do not determine it by themselves. Due to the reinterpretation of the presuppositional 
structure irom a timeless to a temporal-historical ground, the historical-critical method is 
not only demoted to the lower level of procedure, but it also suffers a reinterpretation of 
its reach and purpose. In dealing with history the guiding ground is the historical activities 
of God in history as interpreted by Scripture and not the scientific hypothetical 
reconstruction of the cultural milieu. Thus the method turns into procedure. And as the 
procedure works on a different interpretation of the intellectual ground, the secular study 
of history does not become the criterion for the historical interpretation of Scripture. It 
is probable, then, that it would be best to talk about a historical-scholarly procedure 
rat her than historical-critical procedure. 
6)This methodology needs careful discussion. It necessarily includes going to the 
facts on which theology is to be built. Edrnund Husserl calls these facts "things." Among 
the various facts that are given to us, he includes human products which involve 
hermeneutics (The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology [Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 19701, 138). In the case of theology, the facts are the 
products of revelation-inspiration, namely, all the words and meanings of Scripture. 
Besides going to the facts themselves-Scripture, exegesis, and theology-we have to take 
a second step: philosophical-scientific j?rox$ (ibid., 135). In this phase exegetes and 
theologians cancel out all previously inherited theories interpreting the data which could 
prove to be hindrances to the understanding of Scripture. This second facet leads to a 
third, which allows the exegete and theologian to discover and describe the general 
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This is not the place to formulate or even sketch this necessary alternate 
exegetical methodology. Suffice it to say that to recognize or even 
accept the historical-cognitive model of revelation-inspiration will make 
no noticeable change in Christian theology if the exegetical 
methodology is not reformulated. 
The development of Christian theology necessitates not only the. 
possession of revealed and inspired data and the appropriate exegetical 
methodology to interpret them, but also the formulation and utilization 
of a priori categories, which in this series of articles I have identified as 
presuppositional structure. Inner coherence should drive Christian theo- 
logy to conceive and formulate its presuppositional structure, employing 
a biblical rather than philosophical or scientific interpretati~n.~' If
biblical authors utilized a biblically originated interpretation of the 
presuppositional structure, rather than depending on extrabiblical 
religious, philosophical, or scientific conceptions, why should we do 
otherwise? In determining the general hermeneutical patterns for the 
interpretation of Scripture (exegesis and biblical theology) and the 
system for the development of Christian teachings (systematic theology), 
it would be advisable to employ the same biblical presuppositional 
structure. The paradigmatic shift from a philosophical or scientific 
interpretation to a biblically grounded interpretation of the presupposi- 
tional structure entailed in the historical-cognitive model of revelation- 
inspiration makes possible the development of Christian theology on 
the basis of the sola Scriptura principle.65 
Finally, an additional implication of the historical-cognitive model 
affects the roles that related sciences-such as philosophy, factual and 
human sciences, and tradition-may be called to play in Christian 
theology. A secondary, subordinated role is directly called for by the 
sola and rota Scriptura principles and can be designated as the prima 
Scriptura principle. Briefly stated, philosophy, science, and tradition are 
not to be conceived as data on which Christian theology should be built 
presuppositional structure assumed by the biblical writers (ibid., 139). This third step is 
needed for the development of exegesis and theology as sciences. 
@The basic contents of the biblical presuppositional structure have been identified 
and utilized in the conception and formulation of the historical-cognitive model of 
revelation-inspiration suggested in this article. 
650nly this paradigmatic shift at the presuppositional-structure level can answer or 
even reverse Pannenberg's assessment that the Scripture principle is in crisis, and that a 
theology "concerned only with the special aspects of revelation and thus only with the 
interpretation of Scripture, regardless of the results attained by other sciences from their 
presuppositions," is an "illusion" ("The Crisis of the Scripture-Principle in Protestant 
Theology," Dialog 2 (1963): 308. 
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or its methodologies and presuppositional structure determined. 
Extrabiblical sources are to be approached ~ r i t i c a l l y .~~  Aristotle 
expressed the need to be critical of tradition by politely stating that 
"piety requires us to honour truth above our friends."" In a secondary 
sense, however, there may be times and opportunities in which some 
facts resulting from the activities of philosophy, science, and tradition 
might become useful for the theological task. Yet, the utilization of 
such information must always be subordinated to a criticism and 
reinterpretation of its meaning by way of the application of the sola and 
tota Scriptura principles. In the development of Christian theology, 
then, extrabiblical materials can be incorporated only on the basis of the 
prima Scriptura principle. 
In this series of articles exploring the epistemological origin of 
Scripture I have purposely attempted to be concise. Consequently, I 
could not address all the related issues in the length and detail that a full 
development of the revelation-inspiration doctrine requires. My purpose 
has been to probe the main characteristics involved in the principal 
models of revelation-inspiration developed throughout the history of 
Christian theology in order to explore the possibility for and profile of 
an alternate approach. 
Two models, very carefully and technically developed, have been 
already formulated. Generally speaking, Christian theology seems 
satisfied with these generally accepted models. At the same time, these 
divide Christian theology into classical and liberal camps. Our brief 
consideration of each model pointed out that neither is able to 
coherently and completely reconcile and include the basic data for any 
doctrine of revelation-inspiration, namely, the claims of Scripture about 
its divine origin and its obvious humanness, as revealed by the 
phenomena of Scripture. 
I initiated this series designed to explore the issue of revelation and 
inspiration from an epistemological perspective by asking whether 
theological scholarship should be satisfied with already-existing theories 
about revelation and inspiration, or whether there would be room for 
the development of a new understanding of the way in which the 
Hebrew-Christian Scriptures were originated. 
&In other words, additional sources are integrated by first being canceled out 
(philosophical-theoretical ;noX$); then, by reinterpreting their meaning made to fit the 
new presuppositional structure present in the facts (Scripture) themselves. 
("Ethics Nicomachea, 1, 6, 1096a, 10. 
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Our probing into the issue seems to provide the following answer: 
Besides the already-existent classical and liberal models of revelation and 
inspiration, there is room for an alternate model, namely, the historical- 
cognitive model. The possibility and framework of an alternate model reside 
in what had already made possible the existence of the other two competing 
models: the fact that the presuppositional structure on which theological 
models are constructed can be interpreted in different ways. The classical 
and liberal models differ in the philosophical bases chosen for the 
interpretation of their respective pres<ppositional structures. The historical- 
cognitive model, departing from the classical and liberal, defines the 
intL-pretation of its iresuppositional structure from biblical thought. This 
step leads to a viable integration of the various patterns of biblical revelation 
and in~piration.~' 
As the specific contour of the historical-cognitive model was roughly 
depicted in this article, some readers may be wondering what is "new" in it. 
They may find themselves thinking that what has been presented as a "new 
approach" is only the old traditionally held belief. I am not claiming 
originality in suggesting a historical-cognitive model. I have not created the 
model but only recognized it in Scripture. Many others might also have 
recognized it simply because it is there. I hope, however, that'a careful 
reading of this series might have led such sympathetic readers to the 
realization that there is a broad theological difference between what many 
believe when they read Scripture and go to church, and the technically 
conceived and formulated content of the classical and liberal models. The 
historical-cognitive model, in faithfulness to Scripture, basically tries to 
express in the technical realm of epistemology the belief that follows from 
a consistent phenomenological, prescientific reading of Scripture. 
The succinct presentation of the epistemological possibility and 
characteristics of the historical-cognitive model does not suffice to draw 
viable conclusions regarding the issue of inerrancy or accuracy of Scripture. 
Unfortunately, recent emphasis on the issue of scriptural inerrancy has taken 
precedence over the investigation of issues that need prior clarification. For 
instance, additional development of the model-as well as gounding 
reflection on the nature of truth, error, accuracy, and exactness- is required 
before any attempt at even exploring this issue can be ~n de r t aken .~~  After 
?See Pannenberg, Systematic 7%eology, 1:229. 
69The issue of inerrancy of Scripture is epistemological. It questions the truth and 
accuracy of Scriptures. Dismissing inerrancy on the perfunctory basis that it requires the 
harmonization of Scripture (thereby conflicting with exegesis), that it carries with it the 
danger of bibliolatry, that it is pastorally disastrous (James Dunn, "The Authority of 
Scripture According to Scripture [Part I]," 116-117), and that it is not a biblical teaching 
(Dunn, "The Authority of Scripture According to Scripture [Part 21," 221) seems 
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this is done, the full revelation-inspiration doctrine needs to be developed 
from an analysis of the claims and phenomena of Scripture. Certainly the 
historical-cognitive model would depart from the way this issue has been 
understood by either the classical or liberal model. I suggest that this longer, 
more painful route be taken before hasty conclusions on the accuracy of 
Scripture are drawn. 
Through a brief but careful exploration of the classical, liberal, and 
historical-cognitive models, two basic facts have become apparent. In the 
actual task of doing theology it is not possible to adopt the three models at 
the same time. Theologians must choose. Besides, it has become apparent 
that each model will generate and justify widely differing theologies. 
Which model should Christian theology adopt? From a rational 
viewpoint it is impossible to make an absolute choice. Many choose on the 
basis of tradition or philosophical considerations. In my opinion, Christian 
theology should seriously consider switching from the classical and liberal 
models to the historical-cognitive because the latter flows directly from the 
- 
biblical interpretation of the presuppositional structure and, in so doing, is 
able to harmoniously integrate both the claims and phenomena of Scripture. 
Having said that, let me assure Christian theologians sharing different views 
that, from a rational perspective, I consider the historicalcognitive model to 
represent a viable alternative to the classical and liberal models. Yet, by the 
same token, I hope those subscribing to the classical and liberal models 
could come to the point of realizing that, from a rational perspective, their 
positions are, likewise, viable alternatives to the historical-cognitive 
approach. If scholars and theologians presently working under the classical 
and liberal models are willing to concede this first step, it is possible that 
they may also come to the point of perceiving the way in which the 
historical-cognitive model is able to overcome the limitations of the classical 
and liberal models. The overcoming takes place by finding and 
systematically utilizing the biblical interpretation of the presuppositional 
structure of the revelation-inspiration doctrine. Thus, the cognitive aspect of 
the classical model is kept but reinterpreted according to a historical 
understanding of reality and cognition emphasized by the liberal model. As 
a result the historical-cognitive model not only exhibits inner rational 
coherence, but also grounds external coherence with the claims and 
phenomena of Scripture. 
insufficient. A grounding epistemology, developed within the parameters of the 
presuppositional structure of the historical-cognitive model, is required before any 
judgment on the accuracy of Scripture could be made. 
